Immigrations, Refugees and Citizenship
Adjournment Proceedings
May 4th, 2021 / 6:45 p.m.
Jenny Kwan Vancouver East, BC
NDP
Madam Speaker, it has been brought to light that Canada's visa application centre in China has been subcontracted to a Chinese state-owned company run and operated by the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau. The company that was awarded the contract, VFS Global, has confirmed at the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration that the Canadian government knew right from the beginning that services were being subcontracted and that it was informed of the ownership structure of the company.
This happened under the watch of the Harper government, and clearly the Conservatives were asleep at the switch. Former immigration minister, Jason Kenney, now the Premier of Alberta, said he did not know about it. I cannot help but ask how on earth he did not know about something as significant as that. It speaks to the level of his incompetence and disregard for the important work conducted by Canada’s visa application centres.
The saga does not end there. In 2018, the contract was renewed by the Liberal government, yet no changes were made. In fact, Public Services and Procurement Canada confirmed that it did not even know that services in Canada’s visa application centre in China had been subcontracted to a company owned by the Beijing police until The Globe and Mail brought it to their attention in February 2021. The Liberals say they underwent a vigorous process for the contract renewals. However, somehow the Liberal government was still oblivious to the fact that Canada’s visa application centre is effectively run and operated by people hired by the Beijing police.
It really shakes one's confidence about the government’s vetting process and makes one wonder what sort of security checks are done. Was CSIS even consulted on this? A former CSIS director was quoted as saying, “I cannot think of a more promising entry point for China’s cyberspies.” According to Richard Kurland, “The VFS organization may have more personal information on applicants for immigrant services than entire countries do.”
It has been reported by The Globe and Mail that 86% of staff are being hired by the company owned by the Beijing police. In what world would having 86% of the staff employed by an arm of the Beijing police be a good idea, when they are receiving the kind of sensitive information that visa application centres handle? Since the subcontractor is a Chinese-owned state firm, according to Chinese regulations the party's secretary must be the chair of the board of the company and the general manager position must be filled by the deputy party committee secretary. This means the subcontractor handling Canada’s visa centre services is run and operated by the party secretary and deputy party secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.
I went on Google and was able to find the minutes of the CCP meeting in which it appointed its party secretary and deputy party secretary to these positions. Can anyone imagine that the chair of the company running and operating Canada’s visa application centre in China is the party secretary of the CCP branch in that region and the general manager is the deputy party secretary? They have to swear an oath of allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party, and it is their duty to execute the will of the party. That is where their first loyalties lie. If we were prospective applicants, would we feel confident that our personal information for the immigration application is being handled by a company owned by the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau? If the Chinese get wind of the fact that a pro-democracy activist or someone who is sympathetic to the Uighurs in China is trying to get a visa to Canada, do we not think they would be in jeopardy?
Peter Schiefke Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Immigration
Vaudreuil—Soulanges
Québec
Madam Speaker, I am thankful for the chance to address the question from the hon. member.
I want to start by emphasizing that safeguarding applicants' personal information and privacy is always the top priority for Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, or IRCC, and the Government of Canada.
In fact, IRCC uses visa application centres, or VACs, to provide administrative support and biometric collection services in local languages to visa applicants. VACs do not play a role in the decision-making process and are expressly forbidden to provide any visa-related advice to applicants. All decisions are made by highly trained IRCC officials.
As well, all immigration information gathered at VACs is transmitted directly to Canada and is stored in Canada. This is a one-way process and operates similarly to a client-facing web page. No immigration data is retained at the VACs, and Canadian officials closely monitor the activities of VACs around the world to ensure that privacy standards are met, as per Canadian laws. In addition, the Government of Canada performed its due diligence in vetting the contractor, VFS Global, and has required that all employees in VACs who have access to personal information, including subcontractor employees, are screened to Canadian standards.
I should also note that Public Services and Procurement Canada's contract security program, in partnership with IRCC, commissioned the lead Canadian security agencies to establish the required measures. Their advice was an integral part of the contractor screening process and was used to identify the risk mitigation strategies that should be considered when opening VACs around the world.
As the hon. member understands very well, there are risks to operating in any foreign environment, and the Government of Canada is well aware of the risks of operating in China. IRCC officials closely monitor the activities at visa application centres to ensure that our stringent privacy standards, as detailed in the contract, are met.
As part of this work, since the beginning of the contract, IRCC has regularly carried out audits and inspections for compliance at all VACs around the world. This includes both scheduled and unannounced audits and site reviews conducted by IRCC officials. Since 2018, IRCC has reviewed and conducted over 20 site visits to VACs in China alone. IRCC video cameras also monitor every time biometrics are submitted.
The contractors must notify Canada immediately of any data breaches at the VACs, as well as any other situations or difficulties that may arise or will have an impact upon the scope of the work, security and protection of personal information included. IRCC is responsible, in consultation with PSPC, for determining whether a reported problem constitutes a privacy breach, and if a privacy breach were to occur, a report would be created to report how the breach occurred, the remedial actions being taken and the mitigation measures proposed by the contractor to prevent reoccurence. No privacy breaches have been reported to date.
VFS Global has been compliant with its security requirements pursuant to its contract with the Government of Canada. The Government of Canada will continue to improve and implement measures to enhance security requirements, especially in the international context.
Jenny Kwan Vancouver East, BC
NDP
Madam Speaker, the government did not even know until recently that the visa application centre operating in Beijing is owned by the Beijing police. The Liberals keep on saying, “Don't worry, be happy”. It does not matter that the information never gets into the system or that the information is wiped clean after 30 days on the network. The fact of the matter is that a prospective applicant's situation may be compromised on day one. The minute they walk into that office and hand their file over to staff, who have been hired by Beijing police, they may be compromised.
In the United States, the handling of the visa application services in China is being done in-house.
My question for the Liberal government is this: Why can Canada not do the same, ensure there is absolute full protection and bring that service back in-house? We should not have a visa application centre in China operated and run by the Communist Chinese Party. We should not be doing that.
