HANSARD: First hour debate on PMB C-233 to close arm embargo loophole

Mr. Speaker, I want to begin by commending the member for Vancouver East for her ongoing and very steadfast commitment to strengthening oversight and to bringing peace in our world. She has attempted to do that in the bill, and I believe that all members of the House agree that Canada must maintain a strong export control system to prevent the misuse of weapons anywhere and everywhere.

Right now, global security matters more than ever, and Canada must act with clarity and resolve. The decisions we make today in the House will shape not only our sovereignty but also the safety of Canadians and of our allies around the world. Accountability does matter, but Bill C-233 as it is drafted, while perhaps well-intentioned, would risk undermining Canada's security, international security, our defence industry and our international partnerships at a critical moment.

Indeed, since the Second World War, Canada has strengthened our export controls for arms to the point where we are privileged to have one of the world's strongest, strictest and soundest regimes. For generations, countries have looked to Canada as a leader, as a peacekeeper and as one of the world's most steadfast promoters of the responsible use and sale of military equipment. Canada's voice matters.

Canadians are wanted and needed to promote peace, to make peace and to keep peace. That is why a Liberal government under then foreign minister Lester Pearson ensured that Canada was there to found the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces. It was a Liberal government that made sure Canada was a founding member of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.

That is why the Liberal government ensured that Canada was one of the founding members of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.

It was a Liberal government under then foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy that shepherded the Ottawa convention to ratification, banning the practice and use of landmines. A Liberal government then ratified the Arms Trade Treaty in 2019.

Canada's efforts do not go unnoticed. When looking to refine their export control systems, other countries have looked to our own as one of the strongest and most effective examples. I know it has been many years, but I would remind the member for Vancouver East of the debate while she was an MP in 2018, respecting Bill C-47 during the 42nd Parliament. Canada had a strong debate about that and put in standards that not only meet the Arms Trade Treaty requirements but exceed them.

We apply exemptions more narrowly than any other ATT signatory does. We control a wider range of items than the ATT requires. Not only do we place controls on conventional arms; we also control dual-use goods and nuclear, chemical, biological and missile technologies. We impose a stricter criterion for denials than those specified under the ATT, such as where there is a risk of contributing to gender-based violence, terrorism or organized crime, and we enforce those rules. We enforce controls on Canadians involved in the transfers of military goods, even if the goods never enter Canada. We have tabled annual reports to Parliament on the export of ATT items ever since the 1990s, long before the ATT's ratification.

In deciding whether to issue or not issue an export permit, the current law dictates that it be taken into consideration whether the proposed export would contribute to peace and security, or undermine it, and whether it could be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law. We are very serious when we take these matters into consideration, and we are vigilant on the enforcement of the law; those who breach it are held accountable.

Suggesting that Canada is not compliant with the ATT is not only misleading; Canadians also both need and deserve to hear the truth about it. We have a comprehensive legal framework, a legislative framework, that we in Parliament have contributed to and that now the Government of Canada enforces.

Thus, we can see that Bill C-233, while based on good intentions about keeping people safe, is actually based on false premises. Canada has one of the strongest military export control systems in the world, and considerations for human rights are at its very core.

Instead of strengthening Canada's ability to promote responsible use and sale of military goods, this well-intentioned but misguided piece of legislation has wide-reaching implications, and it would have unintended consequences. We are working to fulfill our NATO commitments. We want to bolster security and defence industries. We want to diversify trading partners, and this bill would put us out of step with our allies in licensing efficiency, transparency and the use of appropriate discretion.

We are a NATO country. We need to be part of NATO, and the security of NATO is something that Canadians depend on. That does mean, for us in the House today, that we need to keep our NATO obligations and build upon them. This legislation would undermine that.

The changes proposed in the bill would severely hinder our defence industry by creating further instability. It would weaken Canada's role in NATO by creating unnecessary delays and potentially blocking Canadian-made materials and equipment from getting to our allies to keep our world safe, allies like Ukraine, and it would jeopardize the capabilities of our Canadian Armed Forces by constraining the way they get the supply of critical equipment and impeding their operations in vital regions like the Arctic.

Under Canada's existing export control framework, Canada allows certain military items to be exported without permits, provided they are destined for specific countries. This flexibility is embedded in the systems of our closest allies, such as the U.K., the EU and Australia. We also have deep and symbolic relationships with other partners, such as the United States, and it is a party for which the ATT also provides certain exemptions. Canada already applies this discretion more narrowly than any of the other nations granting permit-free access to only one country.

Let me be perfectly clear. Any exemption that we provide the U.S. is not a loophole. It reflects a unique geopolitical relationship rooted in our shared security commitments, continental defence and decades of military integration. This legislation would undermine these efforts and make both of our countries less secure with greater threats to our sovereignty and our stability.

The bill's stringent permitting requirements would not only strain our relations with the United States and our co-operation, but also disrupt relationships around the world. Mandatory delays in approvals would place Canadian suppliers at competitive disadvantages in Europe and Oceania, while restrictive end-user requirements could hinder Canada's ability to support partners like Ukraine in a critical time.

Let me get to the heart of this. We are in a consequential moment for global security. We have had an election. Canadians have declared that our sovereignty and our security are paramount. We are serious. We call upon all parties in the House to take that consideration seriously to ensure that Canada can defend itself and can work with our NATO allies to defend ourselves in the world.

Mr. Speaker, tonight we are debating Bill C‑233, an act to amend the Export and Import Permits Act, introduced by the member for Vancouver East.

I will begin by outlining the main points. Bill C‑233 amends the Export and Import Permits Act to remove certain exemptions for the export of arms, ammunition and military or dual-use equipment.

The objectives of the bill are as follows:

(a) clarifying that parts, components and technology necessary for the assembly or use of arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war are included in the meaning of those terms; (b) preventing exemptions from the Export Control List for arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war based on their country of destination; (c) preventing the issuance of general export permits for arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war; (d) preventing the issuance of general brokering permits for arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war; (e) enhancing the considerations that the Minister must take into account in issuing a permit to export or broker arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war; (f) providing that the Minister must require end-use certificates from the government of a country to which arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war are being exported if doing so would sufficiently mitigate a substantial risk of war crimes or violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law; and (g) requiring the Minister to prepare and table in Parliament an annual report on the export of arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war and Canada’s compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty.

Obviously, the example that comes to mind today is the brutal Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I know that there are other examples, but this is the one we are going to use to illustrate certain points during our discussion. Let us not forget that the NDP, which is introducing this bill, and the Bloc Québécois were among the first to demand an end to arms sales to Israel. We still support that. Neither the NDP nor the Bloc Québécois has been shy about denouncing the crimes being committed by the Netanyahu administration in Palestine, whether in the past, present or possibly in the future.

The idea underlying the bill we are discussing is this: Even if everyone agrees on the need to stop selling weapons to a country that would misuse them, whether in Gaza or elsewhere, nothing currently stops a country from selling arms to a third country. A country could buy weapons from Canada and then resell them to another country officially boycotted by Canada. The example closest to home would be if the United States were to buy weapons from Canada and then ship them to Israel, making it appear as though Canada had sent weapons to Israel itself.

I want to start by saying that we support the intentions of Bill C‑233. I also want to commend the member for Vancouver East on her constant efforts to promote world peace. This bill is a testament to her commitment to that. The bill is full of good intentions, but the Bloc Québécois has a number of concerns about some of its aspects.

Our first concern is that it is doubtful whether it will actually work, because the defence industries of the United States and Canada are extremely integrated. That is already quite a headache. Bill C‑233 amends the Export and Import Permits Act to add restrictions. It eliminates the exemptions that were provided for under the act.

In addition, the bill would require U.S. importers to produce a certificate stating that the weapons or ammunition would not be used to commit any crimes. The intention is entirely commendable, but the addition of such constraints and the lack of predictability in the government's decision mean that American companies will simply seek out other suppliers to reduce the risk that their imports will be blocked by the Canadian government. In short, to use the example given, the Americans would stop buying weapons from Canada but could continue to get them elsewhere and sell them to be used in Gaza anyway. We have no control over the choices the Americans make, and it is unrealistic to think that we have any kind of leverage over them.

Another problem with the bill is that the threshold for refusing an export is unclear. For example, the bill states that an export permit should be denied if there is a risk that a weapon could be used against civilians or civilian buildings. In that case, all exports to the United States would have to be halted, since there is always a risk—through negligence, through error or sometimes deliberately out of necessity, unfortunately—that civilians or buildings will be hit by a U.S. strike. Take the example of soldiers who disobey their rules of engagement and commit war crimes. The threshold set out in the bill is too vague, too arbitrary.

Here is what the bill says:

...where there is a substantial risk that they would be used to commit or facilitate genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such or other war crimes as defined by international agreements to which Canada is a party;

While the threshold of “genocide” for denying an export permit is clear, the threshold of “attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such” is vague.

Let me give an example. In Iraq and Syria, Daesh terrorists frequently used mosques, schools or hospitals to store weapons and ammunition. Their reasoning was simple. If the global coalition avoided strikes on such locations, the weapons and ammunition would be safe. Conversely, if the coalition were to strike those places, other international bodies would condemn the attacks, undermining public support for military intervention in coalition countries. However, if I understand the spirit of Bill C-233 correctly, striking locations like schools and hospitals would immediately force Canada to halt its exports to coalition countries.

The Bloc Québécois thinks it would be better to leave this up to the government's discretion. Not only would it improve predictability, but it would allow for the possibility of putting pressure on other countries. For example, rather than following rigid rules, we would be able to threaten to halt exports to a country during negotiations and compel it to comply more strictly with international law. That discretion could give us a bargaining tool.

In short, the Bloc Québécois has serious reservations about Bill C‑233, but we believe it is important to listen carefully to the two-hour debate on the issue. We will listen to all the arguments from all sides on this bill and then make a final decision on whether we should refer the bill to committee.

Mr. Speaker, I want to begin by thanking the member for Vancouver East for introducing Bill C‑233, an act to amend the Export and Import Permits Act, as part of Private Members' Business.

I have heard many comments about this bill from people in my riding of Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester. It is clear that Canadians are deeply concerned about our country's role in global security and the responsible export of military equipment. The debate surrounding this bill touches on core Canadian values: our commitment to democracy, human rights, responsible trade and our contribution to making the world a safer place. These are not abstract ideals, but the very foundations of our foreign policy.

No one here disagrees with this bill in principle. Canada must maintain strong export controls to prevent the misuse of weapons. However, Bill C-233 rests upon a false premise.

Canada has one of the world's strongest export control regimes in the world and has updated it over the years accordingly. That is why Canada joined the Arms Trade Treaty in 2019 and updated our laws to ensure full compliance through Bill C-47, a bill that many members, including the member for Vancouver East, should remember well.

Canada's export control system aims to limit the illicit arms trade by preventing weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists, criminals or groups that foment conflict, and to reduce human suffering around the world. Oversight is essential, but it must be balanced and practical. While Bill C‑233 means well, its overly broad scope would create obstacles for Canadian businesses, slow trade and limit Canada's ability to respond effectively to global challenges.

When we debated Bill C‑47, we discussed many of the measures in the bill before us today that concern exemptions. What was true then remains true today in terms of the need to include these measures in our system. In short, the proposals in Bill C‑233 would disrupt a balance that we are able to achieve through existing legislation, regulations and policies.

Let me explain further. The world is changing. Conflicts are evolving and new threats are emerging. Canada must stay agile and ready to respond.

Canada's export control regime was built to keep pace with this changing world. Our risk-managed framework provides the tools needed to act swiftly, doing so, for example, by adding items to the export control list to prevent sensitive technologies from being misused.

Decisions on export permits are taken carefully after a rigorous process that involves a range of experts from across government. This includes evaluating permit applications against the criteria drawn from the Arms Trade Treaty and embedded in Canadian law through the Export and Import Permits Act.

Our system is flexible, but that flexibility does not mean that we are cutting corners. We have a carefully designed risk management framework that balances our national security, international obligations and defence partnerships with the commercial ties that support economic growth in Canada. Our process is designed to take into account intelligence, diplomatic information and human rights considerations. We work closely with Canada's missions abroad, our allies and partners, to make informed decisions that reflect the realities on the ground.

As parliamentarians and Canadians are aware, Canada has suspended or revoked permits when credible evidence of misuse has emerged. Any violations of the Export and Import Permits Act are taken extremely seriously. Those who are found to have breached the law face consequences, including fines, seizures and criminal prosecutions. That is how we help to protect lives and uphold our values. We will always work to do so.

Bill C-233 would hinder our ability to continue with this risk-based approach in three significant ways.

First, Bill C-233 seeks to create a statutory definition of arms that could potentially include items that are not weapons at all, such as navigation systems, software and even basic mechanical parts. The bill's proposed definition could have Canada needlessly regulating thousands of products, from nuts and bolts to steel and aluminum. This would put Canada out of step with allies, whose focus is rightly on high-risk technologies and high-risk destinations. Further, this would overwhelm our export control system, require staggering increases in government resources, slow legitimate trade and hurt Canada's reputation and Canadian businesses, especially small and medium-sized manufacturers, which rely on predictable rules.

Second, this bill seeks to prescribe how export applications are assessed by adding new mandatory requirements for governments to certify the end use of items purchased by private companies in their countries. Not only does this go well beyond what is required by the Arms Trade Treaty, but it would be virtually impossible to implement. Most countries simply do not issue official end-use certificates to private entities. Canada would have neither the authority nor the influence to enforce this provision, and imposing it would only block legitimate exports, including potentially those destined for our allies in Ukraine.

What is more, Canada already conducts thorough end-use and destination risk assessments. End use is verified using a variety of reliable methods. These may include end-use certificates issued by a government when it imports items itself, or other assurances provided by reputable private parties for private exports.

Canada assesses destination countries based on factors such as the strength of their export control systems and the risk of diversion, consistent with how our allies operate. The proposed addition to our assessment criteria would not make the world a safer place. Rather, it would hurt Canadian businesses and their customers, including the Canadian Armed Forces and our NATO allies at a time when we need them most, and undermine Canada's role as a trusted partner.

Third, Bill C-233 would impose costs and burdens on ordinary Canadians. Like many of our allies, Canada uses expedited licensing in specific circumstances for lower-risk military and dual-use items to countries with similarly robust approaches to export controls. This is a standard international practice that enables defence trade to move quickly and securely without compromising oversight and the agility it requires in a rapidly divided world, at a time when we are trying to increase our defence capacity, not decrease it.

This bill would disrupt the balance we have worked so hard to achieve. It proposes restrictions that would increase costs for both the government and Canadian businesses, without improving the quality of decisions. This bill would end the current system that allows most military goods and technology to be exported to the United States without the need for individual permits, which would harm an important trade and defence relationship.

In fact, this bill goes beyond what it claims to do in this area. It would cancel all existing export permits, including long-standing general export and brokering permits. This means that Canadian companies, many of which have already undergone rigorous review, would be forced to start from scratch and re-apply for permits, affecting hard-working Canadian companies that already have very limited resources.

As a result, I wish to inform the House that we are unable to support this bill as it stands, but I think it is important to thank the member for Vancouver East for bringing it before the House.